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InTRoDUCTIon
after nearly two years of conflict, syria has descended 
into a civil war which has been challenging to interpret. 
The main goal of ‘Inside syria’, a conference held at 
lse on 20 september 2012, was to examine the 
syrian conflict from the inside out, to learn what was 
happening on the ground in terms of warring factions, 
rival ideologies and competing visions of the country. 
The conference aimed to delineate and understand 
the social and political features of the regime and 
the various opposition forces including Islamist, 
mainstream and liberal groups. leading international 
scholars and prominent syrian actors addressed 
questions of politics, economics, identity, sectarianism 
and ideology. This report summarizes the key debates 
and findings of the conference.
THe ReGIMe
There is a debate among syria analysts about whether 
bashar assad could have reformed syria before or 
even shortly after the uprisings began or whether he 
inherited an intractable autocratic state from his father. 
Many of the structures and policies which served as 
both insurance and liability for Hafez assad’s regime, 
including the security and intelligence establishments, 
an economy inching towards liberalization, and a 
subtle, yet powerful modality of government which 
encouraged sectarianism, were passed to bashar. Yet 
not only did bashar assad fail to reform the flawed 
system he inherited, but in some regards, he created 
more tensions which contributed to the outbreak of 
protests in 2011.
Causes of the Uprising
bashar narrowed the base of support upon which his 
father’s regime had relied to stay in power and also 
further entrenched the sectarian nature of the regime 
through the placement of family members and alawis 
in powerful positions. In 2005, he stripped power away 
from ‘old guard’ sunnis who had given the regime 
sunni legitimacy, including the Vice President abdul 
Halim Khaddam.
The economy remained only superficially liberalized 
under bashar’s regime. further, the regime’s economic 
policies, which it dubbed ‘social market economy’ to 
bridge the demands of ba’athists and cronies alike, 
continued to be largely reactive and was not fully 
articulated. Through this quasi-liberalisation, a very 
visible economic elite emerged which encouraged 
resentment among the wider population. This clique 
was largely drawn from the alawi community and 
members of assad’s family, and notably included 
bashar’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf. 
syria was full of tensions and divisions before 2011, but 
the uprisings in Tunisia and egypt were also influential 
because they showed the power of what was possible 
and offered tactics and slogans to revolutionaries in syria.
In the years leading up to 2011, the rise of an 
increasingly conservative sunni Islam across the region 
empowered poor, unemployed sunni syrians who 
became more conservative in their religious orientation 
and increasingly bought into a regional narrative of 
sunni assent promoted by saudi arabia and other 
Gulf countries. following bashar’s decision in 2005 to 
cut back on ba’ath Party leadership and reach in rural 
areas, these empowered sheikhs and other religious 
leaders stepped in to run their communities.
Missed Opportunities and the Security Services
When the uprising began, there was still a window of 
opportunity for bashar to implement the necessary 
reforms; an opportunity which had not existed in egypt 
or Tunisia. bashar had sufficient backing from enough 
syrians as well as other arab countries, including Qatar 
and saudi arabia, who encouraged him to reform 
rather than turn to violence. Instead, assad denied the 
existence of legitimate discontent in syria and used 
predictable propaganda tactics.
‘When [the] Syrian uprisings started, the 
regime’s first line of defence was PR, claiming 
that this was all the work of outside forces, a 
conspiracy. But ironically, in the first weeks of 
the uprising, these ‘outside forces’ were actually 
giving Bashar the green light to continue, which 
was different from how Mubarak and Ben Ali 
were treated . . . [Assad] calculated that to 
implement real change would sound the death 
knell of the regime.’ 
- Ghayth Armanazi 
Under Hafez assad, a form of syrian national identity 
was promoted which was deliberately ambiguous, 
including arab, syrian state and Islamic elements. 
alongside a vague national identity, there were no 
concerted efforts to de-sectarianise syria or to allow 
syrian identity to outstrip other sub-state ties.  
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This identity ambiguity was a strength for Hafez assad 
who could rhetorically shape syrian identity to ebb and 
flow according to his foreign policy agenda, but it also 
left a legacy of clear sectarian winners (notably alawis) 
and losers (notably Kurds) and a tinder box of sectarian 
tension for bashar assad. 
Hafez assad ensured there would not be a coup 
against his regime by strengthening the syrian military 
and intelligence services. In the first ten years of his 
rule, he tripled the size of the military through support 
from the Gulf and the soviet Union. He also created an 
elite unit, the Saray ad-Difa, which would provide the 
staff for the army’s infamous fourth Division as well 
as the Presidential Guard. Unlike others, this unit was 
staffed with handpicked career officers, an estimated 
80 per cent of whom were alawi.
The shabiha forces, a shadowy state-sponsored gang 
now operating in syria, also originate from this time. This 
was created as a mafia organization to protect members 
of Hafez assad’s family who were involved in smuggling. 
The group included criminals from syria’s jails. assad 
maintained the loyalty of both the officers and the 
shabiha through a system of corruption and bribery. 
‘He depended on the officers’ corps and he 
managed, throughout the years, to make the big 
percentage of the officers in the military belong 
to the same sect,  the Alawis. I witnessed that 
year after year. I used to monitor every year the 
list where the new officers get graduated from the 
military colleges and I used to see, very obvious, 
how 80 or 70 per cent of the graduates belonged 
to the same sect.’ 
- (Retired) Bridgadier General Akil Hashem
The Centrality and Effects of Violence
In the 1980s, both the fourth Division, during an 
extended standoff between Hafez assad and his 
brother, Rifaat, and the shabiha had to be reined in 
when their power become more of a threat to assad 
than a protection. Just as his father was forced to 
carefully balance both the elite and thuggish forces he 
had created, bashar assad is relying for survival on both 
elements of the pro-regime forces. History suggests 
this could be risky. General akil Hashim described how 
the ‘magic may be turned against the magician.’
equally, in the way that Hafez assad’s regime relied 
on violence and the threat of violence to protect itself 
from coups and violence, violence has now become 
its only weapon. The regime has no choice now but to 
kill and keep killing its citizens, said General Hashim. 
Professor salwa Ismail described this use of violence 
as a modality of governance and a ‘deep cut’ which 
has established an ‘us and them’ culture in the syrian 
state, which has been under a permanent state of war 
against its citizens under both assad leaders. 
‘Syrians knew that were they to oppose the Assad 
rule, there would be mass killings and large 
scale atrocities. The regime has a willingness to 
sacrifice . . . [when the uprisings started], there 
would be references to inside knowledge that 
some high ranking general said, “Well, we’ll 
continue until the first hundred thousand [are 
killed] and that should do it or, you know, half 
a million or whatever.”  Whether this is true or 
exaggerated, it talks about the socio-political 
imagery that Syrians have thought about, their 
relationship with the regime and should they 
oppose it, what will happen to them.’ 
- Professor Salwa Ismail
Professor Ismail identified two tools of violence as 
emblematic of the form of government and rule in 
syria over the last four decades – detention camps 
and massacres.  The regime used violence as both a 
tool and a statement. In addition to the syrians who 
disappeared and were killed in prison camps and 
massacres, the camps were also tools of humiliation 
while the massacres were spectacular gestures of the 
sovereign’s power over life and death. both instruments 
have dominated the syrian imagination about the 
consequences if they resist the assad regimes.
From left to right: Professor Fawaz Gerges, Dr Christopher Phillips, 
(Retired) Brigadier General Akil Hashem and Ghayth Armanazi
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The very mechanisms of violence, real and imagined, 
which both assads have used to keep control have 
shown what the consequences are of challenging the 
regime. This legacy of memory and imagined outcomes 
arguably raised the stakes and fed the outbreak of the 
current violence. The fear of severe retribution forced 
syrians into a zero sum position.
further in syria, as has been demonstrated in the 
genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia as well as the 
systematic torture of alleged terrorists at abu Ghraib 
and Guantanamo, there is a causal link between the 
rhetorical use of the threat of genocide and terror 
and actual acts of genocide and terror.  as with the 
massacre at Hama in 1982, during the recent violence 
the syrian regime has used the threat of mass 
slaughter as a justification to commit mass slaughter. 
In turn, those affected and who witnessed the violence 
feel emboldened to take retribution because all limits 
have been transgressed and, therefore, limits are no 
longer respected. ‘The problem with these narratives 
is that they become self-fulfilling,’ said Dr abdelwahab 
el-affendi. ‘If the trajectory goes as it is, the prophecy 
of the alawis will be fulfilled. They will be politically, if 
not physically, liquidated.’
THe oPPosITIon
While the syrian opposition and various groups within 
it, like the local Coordinating Committees and the 
Revolutionary Councils – are now discussed as though 
they always existed, it is important to note that these 
forces have evolved organically with the conflict and 
are continuing to evolve.
The success or failure of the opposition cannot be 
evaluated in isolation, but must be seen in a wider 
scope that considers national, regional and international 
forces. ‘You cannot take them out of the big context 
and they cannot be evaluated or even monitored 
in a vacuum,’ said Rime allaf. ‘They didn’t act alone. 
You have to always consider when you talk about the 
opposition that there is a ruthless regime which has 
proved in the last 18 months that it would cross every 
single line that we could have imagined. and you also 
have a world which has been living in total apathy, save 
for a few declarations of support to the opposition.’
‘We were let down by the international 
community in all of our requests. Their 
primary excuse was the lack of unity within the 
opposition. In which country can you find an 
opposition that can be completely united?’
- Suheir Atassi
The distinction made between the ‘inside’ opposition 
and the ‘outside’ opposition is not helpful in 
understanding the dynamics of the various syrian 
opposition groups. More useful is the distinction 
between how the individuals or opposition groups 
orient themselves along ideological/religious vs civil/
secular lines. 
There is not one monolithic opposition, but many 
groups that forms oppositions. They include the ‘old 
style’, underground opposition which existed in syria 
prior to the uprisings; a ‘new style’ opposition made 
of young people; independent individuals without 
affiliation or party; and groups of artists, writers and 
social commentators.
The Syrian National Council (SNC)
The snC did not fail, but rather has not been able to 
play the role it was supposed to as the voice of the 
revolution. Though the snC is criticised as an ‘outside’ 
force without connection to the opposition inside syria, 
it is actually in regular communication with opposition 
leaders on the ground in syria. 
The snC is also criticised for clashes between its 
personalities and the fact that it does not have a clear 
leader, but these characteristics can be interpreted both 
as positive and negative.  equally, other syrian opposition 
groups have faced similar difficulties and criticisms. From left to right: Professor Madawi Al- Rasheed, Rime Allaf, Brian 
McQuinn, Suheir Atassi, Abdulwahab Sayed Omar
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In turn, the snC has also been critical of the international 
community for its failure to provide political or military 
solutions for the opposition. The current stalemate, 
Ghalioun said, can be broken either through a change 
of the balance of weaponry on the ground or through a 
more cohesive opposition that legitimately represents 
of the syrian people and is capable of replacing the 
collapsing regime.
‘The division of the international community, 
its hesitation and its incapability of action 
has actually played a very encouraging role of 
the continuation of the violence on behold of 
the Syrian regime, or rather the escalation of 
violence you’ve seen recently because now the 
regime feels like they’re not going to be punished.’ 
- Burhan Ghalioun
The Free Syrian Army (FSA)
The fsa has also evolved organically, beginning first 
with defections of ground-level military, then moving 
on to higher grade defections, many of whom went 
to Turkey. overall, the fsa is not very organised or 
coordinated and lacks a notable and charismatic leader. 
as Rime allaf said, ‘We don’t have a clear Pancho Villa-
type of leader.’ Currently, many battalions fighting in 
syria identify themselves as belonging to the fsa, but 
have ideologies and goals that are very different and 
observers should be careful about lumping together all 
groups who say they are part of the fsa.  
The fsa has received a lot of criticism from syrians 
who might have supported it, particularly because of 
its role in the battle for aleppo. The fsa is aware of this 
criticism and is eager to change its image. as of late 
september 2012 around 30 battalions had pledged to 
sign codes of conduct as part of this effort.
More so than the non-armed opposition, the fsa has been 
challenged to pull itself together as a cohesive unit as a 
result of pressure from outside powers and benefactors. 
Relationships with outside forces have created imbalances 
and complicated allegiances within the fsa.
Local Coordinating Committees (LCCs) and 
Revolutionary Councils 
The first lCC was started in Midan, a neighbourhood in 
Damascus, and like the other lCCs across the country 
that would follow, was established in order to provide 
necessary goods and services, like medical aid, which 
syrians could no longer access safely or at all once the 
uprisings began. 
The lCCs are more organised and better placed to carry 
on if and when the regime falls than they are given credit 
for. In small communities throughout syria, the lCCs 
are already acting, as the regime once did, as managers 
of their own villages and towns. for example, the lCCs 
provide garbage collections, run field hospitals, provide 
education and deliver supplies and food. 
‘You have the coordination of efforts and what 
started initially as one basic council [across 
Syria] has multiplied into a big network of 
councils which are not always working perfectly 
together, but manage on a local level to do what 
they need to do as much as they can’ 
- Rime Allaf
suheir atassi noted that he lCCs do not have an 
overarching leader, but follow a general assembly. 
‘This was by design; we did not want a single leader 
because that could have been easily eliminated by the 
syrian regime.’
Armed Opposition: Lessons from Libya
In libya, there were three stages of armed group 
development from micro groups (‘as many people 
as you could fit in a car’), then larger groups of about 
50 people and finally brigades, often formed during a 
major event, like defending the frontline. 
Though armed groups are often seen as weak because 
they are uncoordinated and leaderless, these qualities 
are sometimes purposeful and powerful because it 
makes their moves less predictable and their acting 
leaders less likely to be individually assassinated. 
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several factors that distinguish groups can help explain 
how and why they stay together or later fall apart:
1. The events and timing around which groups form 
is critical to understand why they gel together. 
for example, in Misrata, many groups were under 
intense pressure without any safe haven, which 
led these groups to be extremely cohesive as 
compared to benghazi where the conditions were 
less tense.
2. The community linkages between a group and a 
particular neighbourhood or geographic area can 
explain the emergence and cohesion of particular 
groups as well as the choices they make as a group. 
Groups with stronger linkages to communities 
may be held more accountable for issues than less 
connected groups.  
3. some groups will coordinate with the local 
authorities and sometimes, particularly during 
fighting, to distinguish between the group and 
the authority.
The Islamists
Islamists – and in the case of syria, this refers mostly 
to the Muslim brotherhood – have been excluded from 
syrian politics for decades. The brotherhood has been 
a movement of exiles. following the Hama Massacre 
in 1982, the only political Islamic groups in operation 
were so-called independent Islamists ‘which were very 
weak and a loose network of a few dozen moderate 
Islamic intellectuals,’ said Dr Thomas Pierret. 
There were also a small group of radical groups like 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, but these groups were harshly repressed 
towards the end of the 1980s.
When the uprisings first began in 2011, the brotherhood 
played a minimal role inside syria. However, the 
group was very influential outside syria, particularly 
within the syrian national Council where they made 
up an estimated 35 per cent of the group. There was 
no strategy to arm or use violence and, in fact, the 
brotherhood advocated a strategy of non-violence. 
In contrast to the brotherhood, the syrian ulama played 
a prominent role at the beginning of uprisings. acting as 
symbols and spokesmen, rather than actual leaders of 
protests, many led sermons condemning oppression. 
Within a few months, the regime lost almost all the 
support of the sunni religious elite. The few remaining 
regime supporters, like the Grand Mufti of syria, were 
considered puppets.
The conflict’s partcipants, including the Islamists and 
other forces on the ground, have become militarised. 
This process began as a grassroots, spontaneous 
response to the militarisation of the repression itself 
and was not a premeditated strategy. In addition 
to reacting to the violent repression, funding from 
Qatar, saudi arabia, Kuwait and private Islamic 
networks, has further encouraged Islamic groups to 
militarise. This funding has also, in some instances, 
encouraged non-Islamic armed rebels to ‘play up’ 
their Islamic credentials. 
Categorising armed-opposition groups as either 
jihadists or non-jihadists is an unhelpful framework 
when all of these groups are, in fact, armed and 
fighting. Rather, an important distinction is the scope 
of a group’s agenda. In particular, are they globally or 
locally focused?  The symbols which a group chooses 
to use, for example images on their flag, may be helpful 
in indicating whether their agenda is local or global, 
though one must keep in mind that symbols may be 
more aspirational than actually reflective of resources 
or abilities of a particular group on the ground. 
a distinction must also be made between foreign 
fighters and globally-focused jihadis, two groups which 
are often conflated. There are globally-focused jihadi 
fighters in syria who are syrian and foreign fighters, 
coming particularly from libya, who are not global 
jihadis, but rather see the syrian situation as a local 
cause similar to their own.
eConoMIC IMPlICaTIons
The Economic Context
syria’s economy was vibrant from the 1950s until the 
mid-1980s, a fact in which syrians had considerable 
pride. The country was a founding member of the 
General agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GaTT) and, 
as a result of the ba’ath Party’s socialist policies in the 
1960s and 1970s, had heavy investment in its physical 
infrastructure and health and education services during 
this period. In 1983, syria’s GDP was higher than Turkey’s 
which, at the time, was on a par with south Korea.
The economy started to decline in the early to mid-
1980s. In 1986, syrian currency started to devalue, a 
pattern which continued for several years. 
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‘That’s an important date,’ said Jihad Yazigi, ‘because 
it is really the beginning of the implosion of the syrian 
middle class. It is the beginning of the end and, to 
this day, the crisis of that period is being felt amongst 
syrian society.’
The consequences of syria’s structural economic 
problems and necessary reforms were delayed with 
the discovery of significant crude oil reserves in 
eastern syria. However, in an attempt to eventually 
tackle the structural problems, the syrian regime 
attempted to liberalise parts of the economy and to 
attract foreign investment. 
Though some investors were attracted to syria, the 
regime’s liberalisation efforts were not paired with 
political or judicial reform. Persistent corruption deterred 
investment. In 2010, for example, 10 years after 
liberalising reforms began, foreign direct investment 
in syria was less than in Jordan, despite the fact that 
syria’s population is five times larger and has more 
natural resources. syria regularly ranked at the bottom 
of all major business competitiveness surveys.
The liberalisation reforms, particularly subsidy reductions, 
were also ill-timed and uncoordinated, leaving various 
sectors unable to adapt quickly enough to the policy 
changes. for instance, in 2008, the government tripled 
the prices of gas and oil. already feeling the pinch from 
the third year of heavy drought, farmers were unable to 
pay for the fuel for their irrigation pumps.
The Economy and the Uprising
by 2011, when the uprising began, there was a distinct 
contrast between urban centres where certain sectors 
were booming as a result of liberalisation (in banking, 
insurance, real estate) and rural areas where slums 
had formed as a result of the agricultural crisis. This led 
to the migration of hundreds of thousands of people 
from northern and eastern syria to the suburbs of 
Damascus, Daraa and Homs.
The uprisings have had three main impacts on syria’s 
economy over the past 18 months:
1. In May 2011, the first set of sanctions was put in 
place which dampened consumer and investor 
confidence. In the first half of 2010, the number 
of investments licensed by the syrian Investment 
agency decreased by 43 per cent from the same 
period in 2010.
2. In response to the uprisings, the regime made 
poor economic policy choices which appeared to 
be knee-jerk reactions based purely on political 
considerations and further deteriorated consumer 
and investor confidence. These policy moves 
included raising civil servant salaries and mazut (a 
gas and heating oil) subsidies and suspending free 
trade agreements with Turkey.
3. In november 2011, further sanctions were 
implemented which had more severe 
consequences than those which were 
implemented in May. These sanctions targeted 
individuals, crude oil exports and the banking 
system. forcing the government to dip into its 
foreign currency reserves to pay for imports, these 
sanctions will have an effect on any future syrian 
government which will be left without reserves.
syria’s GDP contracted last year between 12-15 per 
cent and is expected to contract this year anywhere 
between 20-35 per cent. Unemployment is very high. 
foreign exchange reserves are down and inflation has 
increased significantly. There is severe trade disruption 
as a result of the insecurity of transport and logistics 
routes. The government is ‘really paying only salaries,’ 
noted Yazigi.
While some data is available, it is becoming increasing 
difficult to talk about syria’s formal economy because 
few indicators are published officially and publicly. 
Therefore, anecdotal evidence which differs widely 
from various parts of the country has become a key 
source for analysing the economic situation.
From left to right: Professor Fawaz Gerges, Stephen Starr,  
Jihad Yazigi
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soCIal IMPlICaTIons
There is a huge contrast between syrians in cities, 
particularly aleppo and Damascus, who have benefitted 
from economic liberalisation and those who have 
suffered in rural areas as a result of the drought between 
2007 and 2010 and this helped spark the revolutions.
There is a wide spectrum of support for the regime, 
including many in the cities who benefitted from the 
regime’s economic policies and view the revolution as 
‘a huge inconvenience’ with regular electricity outages 
which also prevents them travelling to their holiday 
homes on the coast. 
sectarian identity is not a clear-cut indicator of one’s 
opposition or support for the regime.  There is a critical 
mass of urban alawis, for example, who have been 
educated abroad, regularly read international news, 
and do not support the regime. In rural areas, however, 
many minorities see bashar assad as a saviour and 
are influenced by syrian state media which runs, for 
example, a ‘stage-managed’ show each week in which 
different sectarian leaders pray together.
The violence has continued, in part because there is 
a diverse mix of opinion about what is happening and 
how to deal with it. early on in the uprising, syrians 
frequently discussed politics and the conflict in public, 
something that had not happened openly in decades. 
but as the conflict has continued, many of these early 
conversations have ended with long-time friends and 
even family members refusing to talk to one another, 
defriending each other on facebook and preferring to 
talk only with those who take their side. 
oPPoRTUnITIes foR fURTHeR 
ReseaRCH
The conference raised the following questions and 
areas for potential future research:
The Legacy of Violence: How has the use of violence 
as a modality of government affected the syrian 
population and what will be its legacy after the war? 
Reconciliation: Truth and reconciliation committees 
will be critical following the war to help facilitate 
communication between syrians who have become 
polarised both as a result of the conflict as well as 
entrenched inequalities and divisions which regime 
policies encouraged. Can the aftermaths of the 
genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia offer roadmaps 
for syria?
Armed Opposition: There is a general lack of 
understanding of armed groups. as a consequence, 
peace processes following civil unrest and war are 
faulty because the demobilisation process does not 
actually suit the groups that are involved.  Investigation 
and mapping of the origins of various armed groups in 
syria and greater understanding of the extent to which 
they coordinate among each other as well as with local 
authorities is needed.
If and when the regime falls, rebels who feel they are 
fighting and dying for syria may find it difficult to give 
up power to political opposition or transition leaders, 
many of whom have been outside syria. Tensions 
should be expected. What will happen to the shabiha 
after the war?
Islamists: There is a need for further research both on 
the agendas and funding of the newly formed armed 
Islamist groups in syria as well as on the tangible ways 
in which these factors influence group behaviour. To 
what degree is a group’s Islamist agenda opportunistic 
in order to receive funding?  To what degree is a group’s 
rhetoric and symbology more aspirational than based 
in reality?
The Economy: It is unclear whether syria’s economy 
will collapse and this depends on how one defines 
collapse. If one speaks to individual syrians, the 
economy may have, in practice, already collapsed in 
their village or town. but in terms of hard figures it is 
hard to say: over the first 18 months of the uprisings, 
inflation rose to 36 per cent and the syrian currency 
lost half its value. In lebanon, it took seven years 
for the country’s currency to collapse; in egypt, the 
currency lost 5 per cent of its value after the revolution. 
The idea of collapse is relative and, without hard data 
coming out of Damascus, syria’s economy will need to 
be monitored quantitatively. 
The reconstruction of syria will cost billions of dollars. 
any reconstruction programmes must be transparent 
and involve a wide-range of participants. What lessons 
can be learned from the experiences of post-war 
lebanon and Iraq?
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